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Abstract
The present essay aims to exhibit the 
manner in which Gramsci and Benjamin 
recover the principles of Marx’s historical 
materialism to carry out the critique of poli-
tical praxis, during the fascist period. From 
them it is possible to understand the indis-
soluble connection between history, politics 
and ethics in political praxis, as well as cri-
tique as a movement inherent to knowledge 
and practice, it is proposed to know, and 
modify, the structures of coercion that are 
set up in the knowledge and in political pra-
xis. From Marx, Gramsci and Benjamin it is 
possible to undertake the task, necessary in 
the present, of knowledge and political pra-
xis where it is imposed a unilateral discourse 
over the conception of society, the life and 
beliefs of the concrete subjects.
Keywords: Gramsci, Benjamin, Marx, 
political praxis, historical materialism, eman-
cipation. 
Resumen
El presente ensayo pretende mostrar el 
modo en que Gramsci y Benjamin recupe-
ran los principios del materialismo histórico 
de Marx para realizar la crítica de la praxis 
política, durante el período fascista. A partir 
de ellos es posible comprender la indisolu-
ble relación entre historia, política y ética 
en toda praxis política, así como la crítica 
como movimiento inherente a todo conoci-
miento y práctica que se propone conocer, y 
modificar, las estructuras de coerción que se 
instauran en el conocimiento y en la praxis 
política. Desde Marx, Gramsci y Benjamin 
es posible emprender la tarea, necesaria en el 
presente, del conocimiento y la praxis polí-
tica donde se impone un discurso unilateral 
en la concepción de la sociedad, de la vida y 
creencias de los sujetos concretos. 
Palabras Clave: Gramsci, Benjamin, 
Marx, praxis política, materialismo históri-
co, emancipación.
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Prelude
From Machiavelli, through Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, to Hegel and Kant, a 
mode of political theory and praxis was forged in which, at every moment when 
there was a politicization (mobilization and organization) of the emerging social 
classes, occurred a counter-flow of depoliticization that has shaped a dominant po-
litical language and practice which tends to dehistorize politics by reducing them to 
administrative technics that dismiss the critique that all political praxis involves: in 
this way politics lose its relation with the material based upon the one that acts and 
from which it emerges, while dilutes its nexus with the past and the future. Such 
a situation forces us to rethink the relations between history, politics and critique, 
to point towards a horizon that makes reconstruction possible, we proceed to re-
cover some of the approaches that go from Marx to Antonio Gramsci and Walter 
Benjamin.
Since the rulers of monopoly integration capitalism´s language, as well as the 
so-called mass media, it has become commonplace to use the term politicize to 
show that public order issues, government issues, do not have a political content, 
but only technical and for it has been elaborated an intricate language where the 
politics are to purge any ideological content or interests, that is, to the govern-
mental, legislative and judicial action. In fact, this tendency leads, irreducibly, to 
a dehistorization of politics, as well as a narrowing of the critique towards the 
censorship of the leaders, to the fulfilment of public policies. The background of 
this approach is a conception of history focused on the political or business boss, 
as leader, where the interests and problems of the subaltern classes disappear: they 
are treated because of individual conditions or shortcomings in the functioning of 
existing institutions.
It is therefore necessary to focus on two authors who, in a central way, dealt with 
the relationship between history, critique and politics, from a critical-dialectical 
posture: Antonio Gramsci and Walter Benjamin, to point out some indications 
of this technical notion of the policy that imposes an univocal conception of the 
socio-historical reality and leads to the passivity of the subjects, where the only 
possibilities of social construction - of possible futures - and of participation are 
restricted to propose ways of execution of the politics imposed by capital.
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In social theory and in contemporary political praxis there is a neglecting on 
the way of historical thinking about politics as well as critique, accompanied by a 
profound depoliticization of the subaltern classes.
Both Gramsci and Benjamin depart from Marx’s epistemological and metho-
dological principles to understand history, politics, and critique and use them to 
question the way in which dominant political praxis once contained a conception 
of history and critique, too narrow, just as Marx and Engels did in their time.
They find, in Marx, the epistemological principles that allude to the manner in 
which the economic production and the social structure derived from it, it´s the basis 
of political and intellectual history, hence, as Marx points out, the first historical fact 
is the production of material life - the satisfaction of material necessities of existence - 
that determines class relations and the legal, political, and ideological superstructure, 
so that categories - theory - must be brought into connection with the development 
of society; that is why Engels indicates that the theory can be understood as discursive 
development, and as praxis when it is referred to the contradictory relation between 
classes and their warfare (Engels y Marx, 1980:51). This operation, necessary for 
Marx and Engels, is to break out with the conception of perennity and inevitability 
(ideology) that the categories of “bourgeois science” set up. Thus, for Marx and En-
gels, history is nothing more than the fight history of the exploiting and exploited, 
dominant and dominated classes, thereby rejecting the idea of a history “as a generic 
act” or as a spirit and critique - method of criticizing, as Marx would said - as a mere 
“war of phrases”, because critique is the movement of one´s own thinking and knows 
its validity in practice (Marx, 1974:17-18; Marx, 1980:187-188).
Gramsci, unit of history, politics and critique
In the first place, Gramsci claims two methodological principles of Marx, na-
mely: 1) the tasks imposed by a society require certain material conditions and, 2) 
a society does not change until developing the forms implicit in their relationships. 
Gramsci, by his very political praxis, tries to show the misconceptions in the do-
minant conceptions of his time regarding the organization of the masses, where 
on the one hand are the conceptions of Sorel and Croce and, on the other hand, 
the disfiguration of the philosophy of praxis for economist (Gramsci, 1999:32-
33), and even insinuates a questioning of Soviet dogmatism. Gramsci maintains 
a conception of history where, on one part, it is expressed as political praxis and, 
on the other, as a process of knowledge. In both cases, critique is incorporated as a 
substantial part of praxis and as of theory (knowledge).
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Although it uses almost indistinct politics and political praxis, the latter category 
is used, fundamentally, to refer to the formation of a collective will for a specific 
purpose, there history is distinguished by its use to shape a myth, an ideology, and a 
utopia to “arouse and organize a political will”. The category of political praxis also 
uses it, to reject the conception of history anchored to the figure of an individual, 
or the idea of history as unpredictable or irrational, disconnected from the analysis 
of social classes (social forces) and material conditions and superstructures (culture) 
in which political will, emerges.
History, both in its form of political praxis and in the process of knowledge, no-
tes Gramsci, implies periodate based on the forms of organization of social forces, 
apprehending their contradictions from: relations between structure and supers-
tructure, the relationship between organic and conjunctural movements. If history 
is used to create a “national-popular collective will” aimed at “the fulfilment of a 
superior and total form of modern civilization”, then political praxis involves the 
concretization in a program, from a discourse (Gramsci, 1999:13-17). It is in this 
sense that he conceives politics as history in action.
Thus, history as a process of knowledge presupposes the knowledge of the struc-
ture distinguishing organic movements (more or less permanent) from the conjunc-
tural movements (occasional, immediate) of this distinction depends on the critique 
that will be made as a historical social critic or of the leaders, of the management staff; 
such a distinction is crucial to differentiate the organic movements that they do 
tend to transform society insofar, as they involve a reorganization of social forces, 
those that can only constitute an organization of antagonistic social forces that 
are expressed as “ideological, religious, political, legal, etc.”. In political praxis, the 
transformation is presented as a historical duty, which avoids confusing the imme-
diate operating causes of the mediating operating, since if political praxis turns into 
economist (doctrinaire or ideologist), mechanistic, or, it ends in voluntarism and 
individualism (Gramsci, 1999:32-33). With this, Gramsci points out, the recons-
truction of history, avoids constructing the present or future because of personal 
desires and passions that inhibit the conscious means that stimulates action.
Thus, the philosophy of praxis oriented to the formation of a collective will for a 
specific purpose allows to maintain a specific relationship of forces either to ensure 
social order or to arouse and organize the political will to transform society; but 
this philosophy of praxis is based on a historical knowledge understood as attempts 
and results, to organize a collective will in relation to the movements of structure 
and relations of force: thus politics is the creation of new equilibrium, new relations 
of force, for that reason political praxis moves within an it must duty that allows 
to warn if “an act is arbitrary or necessary, it is concrete will, or whim, desire, love 
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to fantasy,” politics is “concretion and interpretation, is history and philosophy in 
action... [for that reason] no individual or a work (book) can change... the reality 
but only that they interpret it and indicate the possible line of action”, although the 
“statesman” forces of a State or an army and not only armies of words” (Gramsci, 
1999:31-32) and not because such a “statesman” effectively carries out immediate, 
short-term action.
Finally, what Gramsci inherits is an understanding of politics, of historical ma-
terialism, as a philosophy of praxis, in which he notices a degenerate form “in its 
most widespread form of economistic superstition” because he forgets the thesis 
that men acquire an awareness of fundamental conflicts in the field of ideologies is 
not of a psychological or moralistic nature, but of an organic gnoseological charac-
ter, a conception where politics and history become deception, since history is con-
ceived as a continuous marché de dupés, and “criticism” is reduced “to reveal tricks, 
to provoke scandals, to hold accountable representative men” (Gramsci, 1999:45), 
reduce the state to the mere interest of a fraction of the ruling class, or to a suppo-
sed political realism that exalts the figure of the head of government and, moreover, 
the men who represent the antithesis are forgotten, that is, “another proposition 
of the philosophy of praxis: that «popular beliefs» or beliefs of the type of popular 
beliefs have the validity of material forces” (Gramsci, 1999:45-46).
Thus against the economism and reductionism of the state at the mere interest 
of a fraction of the ruling class, Gramsci erected the concept of hegemony as fun-
damental and the concrete study of ideologies to avoid common sense claims or 
“moralistic accusation of double and evil (for supporters), avoiding the reduction of 
politics to “a series of personal facts ... of who is mocked by its own leaders and does 
not want to be convinced about it by its incurable stupidity” (Gramsci, 1999:47), 
and by of course, to question the history that is made around the great political 
leader, around the heads of government.
Benjamin, political praxis as a way of theorizing critique and constitution of 
subjects
Benjamin, part of the same epistemological principles that Gramsci claims, al-
though the opponents he faces are different, he adds an element of discussion with 
hermeneutics, visible in his approach to how to understand sociohistorical events 
according to their original meaning, modes as it has come to us - as a way of unders-
tanding socio-historical events -, that is, as a result of its own history and as a manner 
of thinking that allows us to capture the movement of societies in time. But he 
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adds that, in a dialectical history, the researcher renounces “the calm, contemplative 
attitude towards his object, to become aware of the critical constellation in which 
the fragment of the past is precisely with the present, that is: connects the present 
action with an original experience to break the continuum of history. From this he 
questions the idea of a history of culture anchored to the ideas of “popularization of 
science”, “public cultural work” (linked to the State) or “education of workers”, or 
under the slogan of knowing power, as Social Democracy put it, assuming that the 
knowledge of bourgeois rule enables the proletariat to emancipate itself; shows that 
in the dominant theorizing forms the technique is exalted, forgetting its link with 
the production of merchandise (Benjamin, 1989:96-97).
As we can see, here, he already glimpses how theorizing, and theoretical debate, 
constitutes a political praxis - or in the Marx of the theses about Feuerbach: dis-
solving the abstract theoretical world to its earthly base, explaining its contradic-
tions, “to criticize theoretically and virtually revolutionize” the material base (Marx, 
1980:2) - which, especially in the realm of history, emphasizes that the historical, 
beyond a date, a great character or genius, an artefact or work of art is revealed as a 
particular experience in the time and in the space in which material conditions of 
production are articulated, the technique associated with it, the relation between 
subjects to which it gives rise –originating meaning–, distinguishing itself from 
the historical development referred to the ways in which it was understood, and the 
ways in which it has been received, has reached the present, and allows us to have 
an understanding of the past by outlining a concrete future-oriented political pra-
xis. Here an anecdotal form where the facts are disjointed from the sociohistorical 
totality to which they belong.
Benjamin calls dialectical history also, as a revolutionary recovery of the past throu-
gh which the oppressed, the interrupted... as part of a political fight that transfor-
ms, because it contributes to politicize the intellectual adhered to the bourgeois 
class by the education, but this only occurs in political praxis, not in the change of 
theoretical or political schemes that give rise to similar looting to those of politi-
cians who kidnap authors, theories (Benjamin, 1989:28, 57).
For historical reconstruction, Benjamin, establishes a tension between continuity 
and discontinuity to break with the vision – and political praxis – tied to the idea 
of a linear time that, occasionally, is altered and corrected to continue an irrepres-
sible march towards progress, towards the realization of humanity. This tension 
arises in social theories  - more specifically, in the narratives of history - and in the 
political praxis expressed in the forms of theorizing (positivist and historicist), in 
the justification of situations of violence (legitimate / illegitimate) that start from 
a conception of a barbaric human nature or in relation to the persecution of ends 
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considered legally fair, or to strategies that involve the extension of freedom and 
democracy without relation to the particular constitution of the social classes, but 
especially in the forms of theorizing and political practice that exalt the technique 
disconnected from the production of merchandise and its destructive character in 
wars (Benjamin, 1989:99-100).
This same linear time is present in social democracy that claims the development 
and use of science and technology exclusively to improve the level of skill of wor-
kers thinking that this leads to the improvement of working and living conditions, 
thereby which transmutes the principle that the proletariat is the last exploited class 
and undertakes the liberation of all dominated classes by invoking all the classes 
previously subjugated by the maxim that the proletariat undertakes the emancipation 
of future classes. Both ways of theorizing and acting, Benjamin points out, main-
tain the idea of a continuous historical time that leads to an understanding or not 
(politically) the class warfare, as well as the connection of the technical-productive 
mechanism from which they are constituted certain social subjects and certain re-
lations between them that imply a barbarism, a violence, of which it is necessary to 
notice as historical materialist concerned with the emancipation.
Understanding this connection makes it also possible to understand the tran-
sit between priest-parish subjects and producer-consumers, which transmits the 
understanding of the cultural as the domain of an image - as a display value - that 
converts the mass into public, subjects the actor to exigencies of the technical me-
chanism and not of the spectator, and yet creates the illusion of the spectator as an 
expert and makes of art (the culture), the art of producing effects that the public 
seeks, in such a way that the mass tends to conform to “certain technical effects” 
with their implications for political praxis visible in building construction (pro-
totype of art) that imposes a way of seeing and feeling, that is, forms a sensitivity 
through daily use and contemplation inhibiting cultural value and dispersing in 
the mass, which serves  - to Benjamin -, to understand what happens to fascism 
and its relationship with the masses when it warns that a proletarization of man 
entails a greater alienation of the masses, while a tendency occurs to organize the 
proletarian masses by inhibiting their demands of suppression of the conditions 
of the property (of exploitation, of oppression); Thus the aestheticism of politics 
becomes violence as a cult of the warlord (manufacture of cultural values) and as a 
suppression of the right of the masses to demand the elimination of the conditions 
of their oppression, going so far as to present war as a disorganization mecha-
nism to mobilize the masses outside their own political action, since the past and 
present (the reconstruction of history) converge in the conservation of property 
conditions mutilating any possibility of future for the masses making barbarism 
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to prevail by denying demand for the abolition of oppression (Cfr. Benjamin, 
1989:55-57).
The tension between continuity and discontinuity - and the way of understan-
ding history as the centre of political praxis corresponding to certain material con-
ditions of production with its technique and the relation between subjects constitu-
ted from those conditions - allows Benjamin to criticize the idea of overcoming  - in 
religion, in philosophy, or in political theory - since in this way both thought and 
history itself are conceived as a continuity that ends in the “bourgeois illusion of 
eternity, and of validity as the ultimate instance of capitalist production, “prevailing 
in the dominant theoretical currents, and in the interpretations and practices of 
Social-Democracy, since these ways of understanding and writing history are part 
of the conformation of social subjects.
In sum, Benjamin raises the need to consider the dominant scientific tendencies 
and material conditions that are present in a conception of history, such as the 
role of Darwinism in the evolutionist conceptions of history. to pose a determinist 
history, to the imposition of “natural laws”, and in political practice is translated 
into specific tactics: to think of society and human action in organic, physiological 
terms... leads to an optimistic conception of history, progress, where barbarism is 
forgotten, or lead to a democratic conception of history, in the sense of measu-
ring the progress of mankind in terms of expanding universal suffrage, erasing the 
distinctions of social class, as the dominated classes have access to vote, to human 
rights (Benjamin, 1989:112-115).
It is a clear example that history is not evolution, causality, is illustrated when it 
questions the idea that the proletarian revolution was forged in the spirit of bour-
geois revolutions, in which it finds its genealogical tree: Benjamin’s objection is 
implanted in the unveiling of bourgeois morality expressed in its revolutions that 
claim the interiority, the conscience of the citizen, bourgeois behaviour anchored to 
“their own interests, but referred to another complementary behaviour of the pro-
letariat, not corresponding to the interests of the latter, proclaimed the conscience 
as a moral instance”, a conscience that preaches altruism, which advises “to favour 
the other proprietors in the middle, and with all ease advises the same to those who 
have nothing” (Benjamin, 1989:121), thus imposes the morality of the ruling class 
that declares all behaviour useful which favours, the dramatic, for Benjamin, is that 
the bourgeoisie has not required so much of that but if it is necessary for the prole-
tariat, if it intends to overthrow the bourgeoisie, it must detach itself from the “good 
conscience” that believes in bourgeois democracy, that is to say: it has to reveal the 
ideology that underlies this conception and that makes it impossible to think of the 
proletarian class “position in the process of production”, which prevents, its own 
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political action, prevents its emancipation and maintains the political action of the 
subordinates on the borders of the negotiation of the conditions of exploitation, 
maintains the reification of the exploited, denies their moral expression, human, by 
interposing between the material conditions of existence of the exploited and them-
selves, a bureaucratic administrative and legal apparatus that inhibits the exercise of 
functions to such subjects, denies moral fullness (Benjamin, 1989:123).
In making history –which has to be understood as political praxis– one has to 
get rid of fetishes, as illustrated by the situation and comprehension of the work 
of art in market conditions: the fetish is the author, the master, not the work of art 
in connection with the existence of society, with the ways in which a “collectivity 
had contemplated ... things and the world” (Benjamin, 1989:132). This is where 
art appears as the historical, to the extent that the emergence of mass art is linked to 
technical reproduction, mass dissemination, which entails reduced cost (Benjamin, 
1989:133) and finds in Fuchs the evidence to claim the oppressed, the despicable, 
the apocryphal, that runs with the development of the productive forces and the 
masses creating “images of the historical man”, which allows to pronounce against 
the cult to the caudillo like sign of humanization (Benjamin, 1989:135) in such a 
way that the art, also, implies a form of political praxis, or at least inspires it.
With Benjamin, we can question the conceptions of history, social theory and 
art, which erase barbarism, or where barbarism itself is understood as the aesthetic 
of politics since they tend to impoverish the vital experience. Hence it is necessary 
to make internal and external poverty emerge not as a nostalgia nor as the full exis-
tence of technical prodigies which men also laugh at, an idea developed by Benja-
min as a relation between experience and history, between experience and poverty, 
to express the way in which the human body undergoes devaluation, experience, 
with “the most atrocious experiences of universal history” during the First World 
War, for it tells us:
No, it was not weird. Because there have never been such denied experiences 
as the strategic ones by the trench warfare, the economic ones by the inflation, 
the corporals by the hunger, the moral by the tyrant. A generation that had gone 
to school on horse-drawn trolley found itself helpless in a landscape in which 
everything but the clouds had changed, and in whose centre, in a field of forces of 
explosions and destructive currents, was the minimum, brittle human body (Ben-
jamin, 1989a:168).
Thus, the idea gets emphasized by the fact that history is a political praxis which, 
to comprehend and act on it, the different spheres of life cannot be separated, as 
strip stories of their horrors and dominated subjects who have been stripped of 
their goods, the word and from the possibilities of their own action.
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That same perspective is maintained in On the Concept of History, where Ben-
jamin starts from an allegory: the automaton that replicates the plays of a chess 
player ensuring, with it, to always win; as well as an idea of happiness tied to the 
experiences lived and to the longed, as a redemption to say that “the same thing ha-
ppens with the representation of the past, of which history makes its own. The past 
carries with it a temporal index through which it is remitted to redemption. There 
exists a secret appointment between the generations that were and that of ours. 
And like every generation that lived before us, we have been given a weak messianic 
force over which the past demands rights. This requirement should not be taken 
lightly. History materialism knows something about it” (Benjamin, 1989b:178). 
Although at the same time it indicates that nothing, of the past, must be conside-
red as lost, hence the question is the idea of humanity redemption, thus “only for 
the redeemed humanity has its past become quotable in each one of its moments” 
(Benjamin, 1989b: 179).
Benjamin directs critique toward the kind of history that has made historical 
materialism to be deformed, which, starting from the class warfare expressed as “a 
fight for rough and material things which without them, the fine and spiritual do 
not exist”, although in the warfare of classes are presented “in another way as how 
we would represent a plunder that the winner keeps. They are alive in it as confi-
dence, courage, humour, cunning, and as courage, acting retroactively in the re-
moteness of the times. They end up calling into question any new victory achieved 
by those who dominate”; this modification of “fine and spiritual” things, cannot 
escape the historical materialist (Benjamin, 1989b:179). This implies the creation 
of images of the past that emerge and disappear “at the instant of their cognoscibi-
lity”, for “historical materialism goes through the image of the past that threatens 
to disappear with every present that is not recognized in it”; hence: “to articulate 
the past historically does not mean to know it «just as it authentically has been». 
It means taking possession of a memory when it glitters just right before a danger. 
To the historical materialism matters to fix an image of the past just as it suddenly 
presents itself to the historical subject right at the moment of danger. The danger 
threatens both the heritage of tradition and those who receive it. In both cases it 
is one and the same: lending itself to be an instrument of the ruling class. In all 
ages it is necessary to try to extract the tradition to the respective conformism that 
is about to subjugate it” (Benjamin, 1989b:180). There he finds an analogy with 
the theological thought that promises a redeemer Messiah, the conqueror of the 
Antichrist. He also sees in this way of historicize “the gift of lighting on in the past 
the spark of hope which is inherent only to the historian who is permeated by the 
following: neither will the dead be safe before the enemy when this succeeds. And 
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this enemy has not ceased of conquering” (Benjamin, 1989b:180-181). As we see, 
writing a story supposes a concrete political praxis, as well as debating the different 
theoretical conceptions that are detached from the material conditions from which 
they emerge.
Benjamin insists on criticizing historians who intend to “revive an age” and that 
they use “a procedure of empathy”, in which, in the case of the “historicist histo-
rian”, empathy is with the conqueror, with the dominators, and their achievement 
presented “as cultural goods”. There the historical materialist distances himself and 
sees in “each and every one [of those cultural goods] an origin which he cannot 
consider without horror. They owe their existence not only to the efforts of the 
great geniuses who created them, but also to the anonymous servitude of their 
contemporaries” (Benjamin, 1989b:182).
Never a document of culture is given without being at the same time of the 
barbarism. And just as he himself is not free from barbarism, neither is the process 
of transmission in which he passes from one to another. That is why the historical 
materialist moves away from him as much as possible. He considers it his own res-
ponsibility to pass the brush against the grain (Benjamin, 1989b:182).
Benjamin turns to “the tradition of the oppressed [who] teaches us that the rule 
is the «state of exception» in which we live. We have to get to a concept of history 
that corresponds to him” it is, then, “to provoke the true state of exception; which 
will improve our position in the fight against fascism”, so that the fight against it is 
not made in the name of progress, otherwise we are content with the “philosophical 
astonishment” that provokes, denoting how “the representation of the history from 
which it proceeds remains” (Benjamin, 1989b:182). It is not a matter of accumula-
ting data after data, but of looking at the catastrophe that accumulates ruins, which 
summons “to awaken the dead and to recompose what has been torn”, but in that 
calling of the dead [to look at the past] giving the back to the future which one is 
being pushed, increasing the ruins, by the progress (Benjamin, 1989b:183); right 
there emerges the demand of history as a current political praxis that questions the 
practices and political ideas that offer to liberate “the political creature,” deceived in 
the faith of progress, invoking a “base in the masses” and “ in the servile insertion 
[of politicians] into an uncontrollable apparatus, “hence the demand for a different 
history, a” history that avoids all complicity with the one to which the aforemen-
tioned politicians keep clinging” (Benjamin, 1989b:184).
And critique is severe when referring to the conformism promoted by social 
democracy clinging to the idea that nothing is with the current of technical deve-
lopment (progress), whose vestiges are already in the Gotha Program by declaring 
“work as «the source of all wealth and all culture»”, of which Marx was already 
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suspicious when he said “that the man who possesses no property other than his 
labour power «has to be the slave of other men who have become proprietors»” 
(Benjamin, 1989b:184-185), nevertheless, he continues to insist that “work is the 
saviour” –the new messiah– and that, therefore, only an improvement of work is 
required; Benjamin attacks against the vulgarized Marxism that:
...it is not ask with the necessary calm for the effect that its own product do to 
the workers so long as they cannot dispose of it. It recognizes only the progress 
of the nature´s domain, but does not want to recognize the setbacks of society. It 
already has the technocratic features that we will find later in fascism. To these be-
longs a concept of nature that catastrophically distinguishes itself from the socialist 
utopias prior to 1848. Work, as it is now understood, leads to the exploitation of 
nature which, with naive satisfaction, opposes the proletariat exploitation (Benja-
min, 1989b:185).
What Benjamin sees there is the way in which the proletariat and its fights are 
conceived as subject, first of historical knowledge as it was in Marx and leads him 
to conceive of it as the last enslaved social class, which will perform “the work of 
liberation in the name of defeated generations”, but that Social Democracy repu-
diates and assigns 
the working class the role of the redeemer of future generations. This has cut the 
nerves of his strength better. The class unlearned in this school both, hatred and the 
will to sacrifice. Since both feed on the image of the enslaved ancestors and not the 
ideal of the liberated descendants (Benjamin, 1989b:186). 
Hence the criticism of social-democratic theory for its dogmatic pretensions 
that are based on the idea of progress of the human race as skills and knowledge, 
of technical progress as inconclusive and incessant that result in a representation 
of a linear, homogeneous, empty time, therefore it is necessary to criticize this re-
presentation of progress (Benjamin, 1989b:187), because “history is the object of a 
construction whose place is not constituted by homogeneous and empty time, but 
for a full time”, “time-now”, that is, as a present that cites the past as a return, but 
it is the space where “dominant class controls”, so it is necessary to move away from 
that representation in order to understand history as a “dialectical leap”, as Marx 
does in speaking of revolution, that is to say, as a way to blow up the continuity of 
history, because:
The historical materialist cannot renounce the concept of a present that is not a 
transition, but has come to a halt in time. Since this concept defines the present in 
which he writes history for his own account. Historicism raises the “eternal” image 
of the past; conversely, the historical materialist poses an experience with him that 
is unique (Benjamin, 1989b: 189).
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Finally, social-democratic theory, or dogmatic historical materialism, anchored 
to the idea of progress, is equated with historicism:
Historicism is content to establish a causal nexus of various historical moments. 
But no fact is already historical because it is a cause. It will become posthumously 
through data that may very well be separated from it for millennia. The historian, 
who starts from it, will stop to unfold the succession of data like a rosary between 
his fingers. It will capture the constellation in which with a previous one very de-
termined has entered its own time. It bases a concept of the present as “time-now” 
in which the splinters of the messianic mess have come in (Benjamin, 1989b:191).
And even worse, the future loses meaning, even the messianic sense inherited 
from Judaism (Cfr. Benjamin, 1989b:191). Thus, it is revealed that history is po-
litical praxis and is marked by violence, as it involves remnants, forgetfulness, bar-
barism, the despicable, and the apocryphal. This gives us another way of unders-
tanding the text For a Critique of Violence, where Benjamin states that “the task of a 
critique of violence can be confined to describing the relationship of violence to law 
and justice”, this is only possible “within an ethical context” (Benjamin, 2001:21).
What stands out is that, for Benjamin, violence is part of political praxis either 
because of the way in which its variants positivist, historicist, social-democratic and 
even dogmatic historical materialism eliminate the subjugated past; as well as in the 
form of a political order, order of right, which covers violence as rationality, since it 
constitutes one of its means, but this raises the question, whether violence “serves 
for righteous or unrighteous ends”, which leaves unresolved “ the question of whe-
ther violence is in general ethical as a means to an end” (Benjamin, 2001:23). The-
refore, it questions the ideological form of the use of violence considered as a factor, 
a natural fact, against its historical consideration that conceives it as an acquisition, 
which happens with the positive law that questions “any right in the process of the 
constitution, only through the critique of its means” (Benjamin, 2001:24).
A key to understanding violence in political praxis is found in the way in which 
Benjamin proposes the connection of all areas of life to the mechanism of technical 
reproduction anchored to the satisfaction of needs and, from which subjects are 
constituted, alienated, that in art dominated by reproduction for mass consump-
tion, only the relationship between producer-consumer subjects and the illusion 
of the spectator as a public expert that is shaped by the production of technical 
effects, whereby sensitivity is subjected to mere contemplation and custom, for 
this reason art forms part of the political war, implying violence, to the extent that 
this constitution of subjects, subjected to the technical mechanism of production, 
disorganizes the proletarianized masses, as social classes which may require the su-
ppression of ownership conditions over the means of production and, at the same 
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time, suppresses the right to the masses to claim the abolition of oppression, in 
short, inhibits their own political action. For this reason, not understanding how 
the technical mechanism of production structures the various spheres of social life 
lead to an isolated treatment of the questions of art, history, politics, economics, 
philosophy, law.
The reconstruction of the connections between these different areas of life is a 
task of a political praxis based on criticism. This situation is reiterated in Benjamin 
when he distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate violence  - based on the 
distinction between natural ends and ends of law - that tear away the structures 
of class domination that appear in the organization of the State and the adminis-
tration of rights, as illustrated by the right to strike, which conferred on labour 
organizations the use of violence, but when exercised by the State, it withdraws that 
right, when it transfers participation or refrains from this in an activity or service 
“which amounts to a «breach of relations»”, but the right to strike is to “evade the 
violence of the employer” by means of declarations of «aversion» or «distancing» 
from the bosses. The violent moment, in the form of blackmail, necessarily appears, 
when the resumption of interrupted activity, from a position of principle, is linked 
to conditions that have nothing to do with the activity or that signify external mo-
difications on it. In this sense, the right to strike represents, from the perspective of 
the labour sector, facing the violence from the State, a right to use violence to serve 
certain ends” as in the case of a revolutionary strike and for the State is an abuse 
to the right to strike (Benjamin, 2001:27), this is the “practical contradiction of 
the rule of law, and that is, that the State recognizes violence, whose natural ends 
are indifferent to it, except for the serious case of the general revolutionary strike” 
(Benjamin, 2001:28).
We may be well entranced by Benjamin’s argument about the way in which law 
emerges from violence and the exercise of rights implies other forms of violence, or 
how the legitimacy of the use of violence is assumed. However, to understand the 
political praxis here is another element that cannot be omitted: for Benjamin, the 
exercise of a right has a potential of violence to the extent that it tends to overturn 
the legal order, makes possible the organization of masses to demand their own 
interests, so the use of violence by the state is not in the mere repression of the 
transgressors, but finds its culminating point in the connection of violence with the 
technical mechanism of production and fall marked in the warlike violence.
In this way, violence can happened when a right is exercised to the extent that 
this action tends to “overthrow the legal order”, thereby revealing that violence 
derived from the exercise of a right is feared because it alters the legal order that 
protects such right, so it does not matter when violence appears as something for-
424 —
tuitous, as a means to achieve a desire or satisfy a need, but it does not found or 
modify the legal order (Benjamin, 2001:28), but precisely in this type of violence, 
which Benjamin calls “pirate”, Military violence appears as a practical contradic-
tion of the rule of law, since the relationship is between subjects of law (states) 
pursuing legal or natural ends, leading to “ceremonies of peace”, that is, recognition 
to the victories of the winner and to fix “the new circumstances... as a new «right» 
(Benjamin, 2001:29) here is fundamental the twist that produces Benjamin when 
declaring that warlike violence, it is the “origin and model of all violence that 
pursues natural ends”, and how “all forms of violence found a right”, because what 
happens is that private persons (subjects of law) are not recognized as the possibility 
of exercising violence to satisfy their natural ends, except in the cases of “the great 
criminal”, for this reason the State fears –and tries to control– the violence that 
founds a new right, being in situations related to the great criminals, of war, or of 
class warfare (Benjamin, 2001:29).
If the technical mechanism of production subdues all areas of life and moulds 
the masses as producer-consumer subjects, right operates as another mechanism for 
the maintenance of the established order, for it subjects citizens to laws; but therein 
lies the problem of criticizing the violence of law: it cannot be performed as a mere 
pacifist invocation, nor can it be done as a simple rejection of any commitment to 
invoke that “«what is in the way is what is allowed»”, since “such a maxim does no-
thing more than untie this reflection of the ethical-historical, of all sense of action 
and of all sense of reality, since rights cannot be constituted if «action» is extracted 
from its context”, it which means that, the criticism of legal violence can begin with 
“the recognition of the safeguarding and promotion of the human interests in the 
person of each individual”, which has to be considered beyond the “establishment 
of a necessary fatally order” founded on “a simple informal reference to «freedom»”, 
since freedom requires a higher order to designate it, while also requires discussing 
“the validity of order of law in its entirety”, since the order of law is threatened by 
“conservative law violence” itself (Benjamin, 2001:30), or a conception of temporal 
continuity, a continuous march towards progress.
Colophon, begin critique to our present
From Gramsci and Benjamin, we have two critical horizons to proceed to ques-
tion the way in which a conception of politics, of political praxis, has been cons-
tituted in the common sense, as in any other social discipline: first an idea of au-
tonomy of the policy with respect to other disciplines, which focuses on the study 
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of power, or conflict, which involves the relationship between men characterized 
by selfishness and instincts, or by relations of friendship and enmity. Hence, de-
historized politics loses its sense of transforming praxis to concentrate only on the 
search and maintenance of power or the handling of conflict between individuals 
to restrain their natural egoisms through law, according to liberal theories. Second, 
the relationship with criticism is lost and politics ends up being locked in the sma-
ll, daily issues of organization, direction and control of a great mass conceived as 
directed, ruled, subordinate, where the figure of the rulers and therefore, of the 
government, to lead to the common welfare, to preserve general interests (which 
are those of capital) expressed in the State as neutral entity, everything is supposedly 
resolved, controlling –moderating– the individual acting and its selfishness, same 
as the possibility of the rulers corruption and improving the functioning of existing 
institutions, the legal order, or the culture of legality and equity. Criticism, as Marx 
would say, becomes phraseology.
The conception of the politics issues and of the State as a neutral and technical 
activity, like other areas of social life and their disjointed knowledge, have become 
the object of recommendations from International financial organisms, in particu-
lar, from which the meetings of ministers and heads of government stand out, but 
there is hardly any mention of the groups of researchers, intellectuals, who elabora-
te, at international level, the recommendations, in the form of scientific studies by 
experts, of new theories that are replicated in the national academic fields or in the 
mass media imposing a language, meanings around things and relations between 
subjects that presents itself as a “public agenda”.
An example of such studies and recommendations is the OECD report, Finan-
cing Democracy, which deals with the financing of political parties and electoral 
campaigns, as well as what it calls the capture risks of public interest policies. It out-
lines a conception of politics centred on the small, everyday issues, where the main 
thing is the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns as a democracy 
guaranteed and neutrality of the State, in such a way that it leads the demands of 
the masses towards discussion about the fact that public policies should not be for 
sale, which is done through private donations, for which the regulation of electoral 
campaigns is recommended, not only transparency in the use of public resources 
to restore public policy trust: what it concerns the OECD is to maintain political 
competition as the key to public debate in the field of “political choices” in terms of 
candidates and parties, competition that is affected by the role of money citizens to 
promote their candidates so that the parties reach the voters, which is why access to 
resources becomes apart from political competition between parties (Cfr. OECD, 
2016:22, 66).
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Obviously, this is not about transforming society, because the participation of 
the citizenship-mass (subject of rights) is restricted to the possibilities of choosing 
candidates and parties, and to express their confidence in the decisions from the 
head of government and existing institutions.
The policy is therefore drawn between the state organization of citizenship 
and the assurance of the conditions of the accumulation process, as shown by the 
overwhelming concern of international organizations, insisting that economic 
growth depends on the flows of foreign investment, which moves, and recovers, 
from the management of public policies, geopolitical risks, and, especially, fiscal 
policies (UNCTAD, 2017: ix). Public policies emphasize investment policies that, 
on one side, are said to have become “more complicated and multifaceted”, and on 
the other hand, they have tended to liberalize the income conditions, to grant in-
centives, or to continue with privatization processes, for direct foreign investment 
in 58 countries, while the regulation of foreign investment revolves more around 
the settlement of disputes and mergers that involve takeovers from abroad (UNC-
TAD, 2017: xii-xiii).
When examining the recommendations of the international organizations, it is 
noticed that there are no social forces (classes) in a social construction project; the 
social-economic structure and its movement becomes a substitute for perennial 
conceptions when the inequalities arising from the mode of production are attribu-
ted to structural problems to be corrected and the political-ideological superstruc-
ture is restricted to questions of culture or mentality that facilitates, or obstruct, 
structural change. In this way, a conception of a linear time, a homogeneous his-
tory, is emphasized, in which one ends up exalting the figure of the political chiefs 
(of government), of entrepreneurs who risk their capital, in front of a mass citizen 
impoverished in terms of their possibilities of vindicating their own interests, as 
subject of rights stripped of their own interests. It is also revealed that the possibi-
lities of undertaking a political praxis, at the national level, are subordinated to the 
relations of each country with the outside world.
Even beyond the state, the large transnational corporations are governing, since 
it is argued that the transformation of the economy rests on the so-called digital 
economy, which is credited with the ability to “... boost competitiveness in all sec-
tors, create new opportunities for companies and entrepreneurship, and opening 
up new avenues for accessing foreign markets and participating in global electronic 
value chains”, as well as fostering a new” geographic relocation “of the industries 
through three-dimensional printing, as well as lead to “greater outsourcing of servi-
ces” or to generate other types of alliances between suppliers and recipients, yet the 
same UNCTAD report notes that only 40% of the assets of the large multinational 
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information and communication technology is moving outside their countries of 
origin and, its major impacts are in “electronic commerce and digital content”, al-
though it is argued that the digital economy augurs prosperity, as long as the digital 
gap between countries get closed and the operations of multinationals are regulated 
(UNCTAD, 2017:xvi-xvii).
The policy – in technical sense – focuses on meeting production growth in rela-
tion to the expansion or contraction of trading, linked to the number of jobs and 
profitability of foreign subsidiaries, but resting that profitability in a salary reduc-
tion, with adverse results because, although the costs of production and therefore 
the demand for goods and services, the crises are described as a result of structural 
problems facing the “new roles of the public, private and external sectors, the ex-
pansion of finance and the increasing income concentration altered the structure 
and dynamics of global demand in a way that heightened vulnerabilities, eventually 
leading to the crisis” (UNCTAD, 2013:12-14). Once again, the barbarism com-
mitted on the large contingents of unemployed workers is now transferred to in-
dividual capacities to become “employable” or “entrepreneur” without connection 
with the mechanism of production and circulation of capital that is reorganized to 
continue expropriating wealth produced socially, so that the misery of the large dis-
possessed masses is attributed to their lack of skills and abilities or their limitations 
to access credit.
The most paradoxical is the way in which a relationship is established between 
fiscal policy, democracy and legitimacy, since it is asserted that: “fiscal policy [is] the 
centre of the relationship between citizens and the State”, so that legitimacy is redu-
ced to “the confidence of citizens in democracy over other forms of government... 
Equally, fiscal legitimacy reflects the confidence that people place in the work of 
the government in the collection and expenditure of tax revenues”, but the crisis of 
legitimacy (reduced to lack of confidence) in fiscal policies in Latin America, says 
OECD, is due to the fact that they do not achieve a redistributive effect, “it does 
not manage to close the gap between rich and poor [because] poor taxation hamper 
the generation of tax revenues, frustrate public spending and undermine fiscal and 
democratic legitimacy”, the remedy they propose is: to increase fiscal efficiency, to 
control public deficits, fiscal responsibility laws, improve transparency to predict 
the macroeconomic environment, reduce inflation, to consolidate public finances 
and a reasonable manage of the debt, to achieve “democratic governance” restric-
ted to acceptance and support for tax reform (Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, 
2007:34).
What political praxis can be done when a conception is imposed that says that 
“democracy allows a country not only to approve reforms, but to adjust in a prag-
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matic way the own process of reforms according to the changes that occur in the 
local conditions or international”? And even more so if it is said that “while public 
finances and democracy do not always go hand in hand, democracy is the poli-
tical regime in which fiscal policy can reach its potential as a tool for allocating 
resources, redistributing income and securing macroeconomic stability” (Centro 
de Desarrollo de la OCDE, 2007:53), the policy is reduced to a technical activity 
where citizens “participate” through mechanisms of transparency and accountabi-
lity, democracy is restricted to political representation and electoral suffrage that 
ensure governance, as not only people are willing to pay taxes, but “people’s atti-
tudes toward democracy and their support for government officials are deployed” 
(Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, 2007:39). The key to this hegemonic policy 
lies in one point: how pension reform promotes “financial development, and even 
[facilitates] savings growth”, as well as favouring foreign investment and private 
sector participation in activities “to improve long-term growth, as more and better 
spending on education, innovative capacity and infrastructure” (Centro de Desa-
rrollo de la OCDE, 2007:30-31).
This entire situation, if we examine it from Gramsci’s approach, reveals a con-
ception of history centred on the character, the public official and the supplanting 
of the interests of the subaltern classes in the public policies of security and social 
welfare subject to fiscal and investment policies. The criticism is restricted to the 
evaluation of the success of public policies, the scandals of party leaders and the 
State: there is no possibility of a transformative political praxis. Moreover, if we 
add Benjamin’s perspective, a reverence for what is established, and for technical 
progress, prevails when it is proposed to improve or correct what exists to include 
the dominated, when in reality they are constituted as subjects conforming to the 
conditions of accumulation of capital.
With Benjamin, we notice how, from the predominance of the technical mecha-
nism of the conditions of production, producers-consumers have been defined as 
being legally defined in terms of rights by gender, ethnicity, age, access to consump-
tion, which have allowed the expropriation of capacity of the oppressed to write 
their own history, cancelling their possibilities of demanding the transformation 
of the conditions of property that are the basis of their oppression, because even 
forms of oppression (exploitation) are thematized restricted to groups of women 
(domestic workers) of working children, of sexual exploitation, as if the production 
of socially produced and privately appropriated wealth was no longer a source of 
oppression, but rather the development of individual capacities (competences), the 
empowerment of specific social groups characterized as a vulnerable population, 
where vulnerability is measured, mainly, in relation to the access to consumption.
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We have in Benjamin and Gramsci proposals that allow us, on one hand, to 
unveil the structure of coercion  - the technical mechanism of production - from 
which docile subjects are constituted to the social order, and, on the other hand, a 
proposal to break with this structure of coercion by organizing the subaltern classes; 
learning the lesson that both history and politics are critically inscribed when the 
task of transforming to emancipate is imposed, and they imply an indissoluble rela-
tionship between theory and praxis that allows us to apprehend socio-historical rea-
lities as a whole. For this reason, it is necessary the critique the dominant theories, 
claiming the category of political praxis, so as not to be trapped in the discussion 
and practices of politics as an exclusive sphere of the State, that is, how policies, in 
the technical sense; to liberate the theoretical consciousness, insofar as it is expres-
sed in language, of its alienation and, consequently, contribute to create a collective 
consciousness oriented to the transformation of the conditions of oppression.
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